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ASSESSING NOMINAL INCOME RULES FOR MONETARY
POLICY WITH MODEL AND DATA UNCERTAINTY*
Glenn D. Rudebusch
Nominal income rules for monetary policy have long been debated, but two issues are of
particular recent interest. First, there are questions about the performance of such rules over a
range of plausible empirical models – especially models with and without explicit rational
inﬂation expectations. Second, there are questions about the performance of these rules in real
time using the type of data that is actually available contemporaneously to policy makers rather
than ﬁnal revised data. This paper determines optimal monetary policy rules in the presence of
such model uncertainty and real-time data uncertainty and ﬁnds only a limited role for
nominal output growth.
Monetary policy rules that focus on smoothing out ﬂuctuations in nominal income
or nominal output have been advocated by many economists, including Gordon
(1985), McCallum (1988, 1997), Hall and Mankiw (1994) and Feldstein and Stock
(1994). At a very basic level, nominal income targeting appears to have two de-
sirable features as a strategy for monetary policy. First, it automatically takes into
account movements in both prices and real output, which in practice are the two
macroeconomic variables that central banks care about most. Second, nominal
income can serve as a long-run nominal anchor for monetary policy. Such an
anchor is important under the usual presumption that the monetary authority
cannot inﬂuence the real economy in the long run and so should focus on sta-
bilising a nominal variable.
Recently, two quite disparate developments have also boosted interest in nom-
inal output targeting.
1 The formation of a new monetary authority in Europe – the
European Central Bank (ECB) – has spurred a lively debate about the most
appropriate strategy for European monetary policy (Rudebusch and Svensson,
2002). The announced ECB strategy contains an element of monetary targeting,
which is closely related to nominal output targeting. Indeed, the ECB (1999) has
explicitly derived its 4½% reference value for M3 growth from a desired growth
rate for nominal output – which is calculated as the sum of an inﬂation target of
less than 2% and a forecasted trend growth rate of real output of 2–2½% – along
with a small adjustment for a secular decline in velocity. As many have noted, both
monetary targeting and nominal output targeting should produce similar out-
comes if there are no large shifts in velocity. Thus, the ECB’s announced monetary
* I thank Henrik Jensen, Ben McCallum, Lars Svensson and other participants at the 1999 ECB/CFS
conference in Frankfurt for helpful comments, as well as many colleagues in the Federal Reserve
System – particularly, Gary Anderson, Bob Tetlow, and John Williams. In addition, the editor and
several referees made helpful contributions. Niloofar Badie and Kirran Bari provided excellent research
assistance. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco or the Federal Reserve System.
1 In this paper, nominal income is synonymous with nominal output though, in the real world, the
two series are obtained from different data sources and the ‘statistical’ discrepancy between them may
be non-trivial – especially in real time.
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[ 402 ]strategy provides support for consideration of nominal output targeting;
conversely, the ECB’s strategy also obtains some further legitimacy from any
favourable research results on nominal output targeting.
A second boost to research in nominal income targeting has come from the
recent behaviour of the US economy. During the late 1990s, most macroeconomic
forecasters made an unusual string of prediction errors in the USA – both over-
predicting inﬂation and underpredicting output growth (Brayton et al., 1999;
Rudebusch, 2001a). These errors raise questions about our understanding of the
current dynamics of inﬂation and output and may signal a structural change in the
economy. In particular, in light of the apparent large amount of uncertainty about
the level of potential output and the dynamics of the US economy, McCallum
(1998), Orphanides (1999) and Trehan (1999) suggest that monetary policy
should focus on nominal output growth because such a strategy does not rely on
uncertain estimates of the level of the output gap.
Still, there remain many skeptics. The most forceful argument against nominal
output targeting is based simply on a view that the timing of real output and
inﬂation responses to monetary policy actions are quite different, with the effects
on output showing up much sooner than those on inﬂation. This view of the
monetary transmission mechanism is common among both academics (using
structural and atheoretical methods) and policy makers (Bank of England, 1999).
Unfortunately, a policy rule that reacts to nominal output necessarily responds in
an identical fashion to ﬂuctuations in real output growth and inﬂation and so does
not perform well with such asynchronous monetary transmission lags. Notably, Ball
(1999) and Svensson (1999a) show that, in a simple backward-looking aggregate
demand and supply model, where monetary policy affects output with a shorter lag
than inﬂation, nominal output targeting leads to dynamic instability, that is, inﬁnite
variances for output and inﬂation.
However, this argument has not gone unchallenged. In particular, McCallum
(1997) notes that the Ball–Svensson result does not generalise to certain macro-
economic models; speciﬁcally, he criticises their inﬂation speciﬁcation, which
depends only on realisations of past inﬂation rather than expectations of future
inﬂation. McCallum ﬁnds that nominal output targeting is not destabilising in a
simple theoretical, forward-looking, rational expectations model, so uncertainty
about the dynamics of the economy may allow one to favour nominal output
targeting.
To resolve these various questions about the desirability of nominal output rules
for monetary policy, this paper explores the performance of such rules allowing for
both uncertainty about the real-time output gap and uncertainty about the ap-
propriate model. This investigation is conducted using a ‘New Keynesian’ model of
output and inﬂation, as introduced in the next section. In the past decade, a broad
consensus has emerged in macroeconomics that such a model provides a useful
framework for analysing monetary policy.
2 In particular, this speciﬁcation
2 Indeed, such a framework is termed the ‘conventional wisdom’ in Svensson (1999b, p. 609) and is
held in similar esteem in, for example, Clarida et al. (2000), McCallum and Nelson (1999a, b),
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and several other contributions in Taylor (1999b).
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Svensson (1999a). However, a key issue is whether the data can resolve at least
some of the uncertainty among the various versions of the model; thus, an
empirically estimated version of the new Keynesian model will be employed.
Section 2 introduces the three policy rules of interest. Two of these rules re-
spond to the growth of nominal output and have been advocated in the literature.
The third, a benchmark for comparison, is a simple version of the Taylor (1993)
rule that reacts to the output gap and inﬂation. Section 3 examines the per-
formance of these three rules in the estimated New Keynesian model. To address
the earlier debate about model speciﬁcation, the degree of inﬂation persistence is
varied over a range from completely backward-looking or adaptive expectations to
completely forward-looking expectations. Almost without exception, the nominal
income rules perform quite poorly relative to the Taylor rule.
The use of the Taylor rule introduces the second issue of recent contention;
namely, the uncertainty about the measurement of the output gap and the likely
performance of the Taylor rule in real time.Areal-time analysis – as deﬁned by
Diebold and Rudebusch (1991) – refers to the use of sequential information sets
that were actually available as history unfolded. Mimicking a real-time analysis is
crucial for assessing policy rules, especially those like the Taylor rule that rely on
variables such as the output gap that may be very difﬁcult to estimate con-
temporaneously (Clarida et al., 2000; Rudebusch, 2001a). Therefore, section 4
incorporates such real-time data uncertainty into the evaluation of the policy
rules.
Finally, section 5 considers a hybrid rule that augments the Taylor rule with a
nominal income response so as to assess the marginal contribution of the latter,
and section 6 provides concluding remarks.
1. An Empirical New Keynesian Model
This section describes the empirical New Keynesian speciﬁcation that is used in the
analysis below. The discussion is conducted in terms of the key aggregate rela-
tionships; however, much of the appeal of the New Keynesian model is that these
relationships have direct foundations in a dynamic general equilibrium model with
temporary nominal price rigidities. For explicit derivations and discussion, see
Woodford (1996), Goodfriend and King (1997), Walsh (1998), Clarida et al.
(2000), Jensen (1999) and the references in footnote 2.
1.1. Inﬂation
The consensus on a theoretical New Keynesian model of inﬂation can be repres-
ented by the equation
pt ¼ lpEtptþ1 þð 1   lpÞpt 1 þ ayyt þ et ð1Þ
where pt is the inﬂation rate, yt is the output gap, Etpt+1 is the expectation of period
t + 1 inﬂation conditional on a time t information set, and 0 £ lp £ 1. In the
recent debate about nominal income rules, for example, Ball (1999), Svensson
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structure for policy analysis. However, they differ on the appropriate value of lp
that is, the degree to which current inﬂation is determined by explicitly rational
expectations of future inﬂation. Ball and Svensson set lp ¼ 0, so current inﬂation
is determined by a lagged or adaptive response to past inﬂation.
3 In contrast,
McCallum considers lp ¼ 1, so prices are set with no reference to past inﬂation. As
McCallum stresses, this difference in the degree of forward-looking behaviour in
the inﬂation equation is the key issue separating his results on the performance
and dynamic stability of a nominal income rule from those of Ball and Svensson.
4
As a theoretical matter, the value of lp is not clearly determined. From the well-
known models of price-setting behaviour of Rotemberg (1982), Calvo (1983) and
Taylor (1980), it is possible to derive an inﬂation equation with lp » 1 (Roberts,
1995). However, many authors assume that, with realistic costs of adjustment and
overlapping price and wage contracts, there will be some inertia in inﬂation, so lp
will be less than one (Svensson, 1999a; Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Fuhrer, 1997).
5
Empirical evidence on the value of lp is thus crucial. To obtain such evidence, I
estimate a version of (1) with quarterly data. Of course, given the institutional
length of price contracts in the real world, the one-period leads and lags in the
theoretical version (1) typically represent annual leads and lags (Svensson, 1999b;
Smets, 2000). Thus, at a quarterly frequency, longer leads and lags are appropriate.
In addition, at a quarterly frequency, the contemporaneous timing of the annual
equation (1) becomes less tenable given real-world recognition, processing, and
adjustment lags. Thus, I reformulate (1) as
pt ¼ lpEt 1 p ptþ3 þð 1   lpÞðap1pt 1 þ ap2pt 2 þ ap3pt 3 þ ap4pt 4Þþayyt 1 þ et
ð2Þ
where Et)1  p ptþ3 represents the expectation of average inﬂation over the next year.
(Speciﬁcally,  p pt is four-quarter inﬂation, i.e. 1
4R3
j¼0pt j.) Speciﬁcation (2) uses a
one-quarter lag on the output gap and a one-quarter lag in the information set for
the formation of expectations. Such lags are common in the theoretical literature
(Svensson, 1999a; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999); however, as described in the
working paper version of this article, similar results were obtained with a variety of
alternative speciﬁcations (including the contemporaneous timing of expecta-
tions).
6 Note that with lp ¼ 0, (2) becomes an empirical version of the adaptive
expectations model in Ball (1999) and Svensson (1999a) that is analysed in
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Rudebusch (2001a). Orphanides (1999) also
assumes that lp ¼ 0.
3 Of course, such a ‘backward-looking’ speciﬁcation may implicitly represent rational expectations
given the structure of the economy.
4 Also, see Dennis (2001) and Rudebusch and Svensson (2002).
5 As an alternative explanation, if some fraction of the population bases its inﬂation expectations
solely on lagged inﬂation, then lp would also be less than one (Roberts, 1998). Indeed, one
interpretation of Ball’s model with lp ¼ 0 is that expectations are completely adaptive.
6 The best approximation with quarterly data of the annual frequency expectation Etpt+1 used in
theoretical models is unresolved. The staggered information sets in Clark et al. (1996) provide another
alternative.
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7 is
pt ¼0:29Et 1 p ptþ3þð0:71Þð0:67pt 1 0:14pt 2þ0:40pt 3þ0:07pt 4Þþ0:13yt 1þet
ð0:08Þð 0:13Þð 0:15Þð 0:15Þ ð Þ ð0:04Þ
ð3Þ
 R R
2 ¼ 0:82 re ¼ 1:012 DW ¼ 1:96
where pt is quarterly inﬂation in the GDP chain-weighted price index (Pt)i n
per cent at an annual rate – i.e. pt ” 4(pt ) pt)1), where pt ¼ 100 ln Pt – and yt is
the output gap – approximately qt   q 
t , where qt ” 100 ln Qt and q 
t   100lnQ 
t
with Qt deﬁned as chain-weighted real GDP and Q 
t deﬁned as potential GDP as
estimated by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (1995). For estimation, one-
year-ahead inﬂation expectations are obtained from the Michigan survey of
inﬂation expectations as in Roberts (1998) and Clark et al. (1996). (The working
paper version of this paper considers an alternative survey of inﬂation expecta-
tions with similar results.) The hypothesis that the sum of all the inﬂation coef-
ﬁcients equalled one (i.e. lp þð 1   lpÞR4
j¼1apj ¼ 1o rR4
j¼1apj ¼ 1), a version of
the natural rate hypothesis, had a p-value of 0.24, so this restriction was imposed
in estimation.
This empirical inﬂation equation appears to be quite consistent with earlier
research – even research that has not used survey-based expectations in estimation.
The coefﬁcient of particular interest is lp which measures the degree of explicitly
forward-looking behaviour. The estimate of lp ¼ 0.29 is statistically signiﬁcantly
different from zero, and the estimated standard error suggests a 90% conﬁdence
interval for lp of between 0.16 and 0.42. The point estimate of lp – about a one-
third weight on future inﬂation – is in the middle of the range of estimates pro-
vided by previous researchers. These researchers have used three basic techniques
to obtain estimates of lp. For example, Fuhrer (1997) estimates an equation quite
similar to (2) using full-information maximum likelihood (in particular, closing
the model with unrestricted autoregressive equations and model-consistent ex-
pectations). With a variety of different measures of the output gap, he obtains
estimates for lp of between 0.02 and 0.20 – none of which are statistically signiﬁc-
antly different from zero. A second (limited-information) estimation method uses
instrumental variables. With this method, Fair (1993) is also unable to reject
lp ¼ 0. In contrast, three other studies (also using instrumental variables) obtain
higher estimates: Chadha et al. (1992) estimate lp ¼ 0.44 with annual data for a
panel of the USA and Canada; Brayton et al. (1997) estimate lp ¼ 0.43 for the
Federal Reserve Board staff’s large-scale macroeconometric model; and Roberts
(1998) estimates lp ¼ 0.28 or, after allowing for a structural break, 0.42. Finally, as
above, a third estimation method uses a direct measure of expectations from
surveys. For example, using the Michigan survey expectations, Clark et al. (1996)
estimate a lp of about 0.40 while Laxton et al. (1998) obtain an estimate of 0.32 for
7 Coefﬁcient standard errors are given in parentheses, and the standard error of the residuals and
Durbin–Watson statistics also are reported. The data are de-meaned, so no constant is needed.
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8 Overall, based on the estimated
equation above and the set of previous empirical estimates and their standard
errors, a wide plausible range for lp – say, an approximate 95% conﬁdence interval
– is probably between 0.0 and 0.6.
9 The size of this interval highlights the need to
examine the robustness of the nominal income rule results with respect to vari-
ation in lp.
The estimated value of ay is also typical, and, as described below, the dynamics of
this equation compare favourably to an unrestricted version. Finally, the estimated
(3) appears to be fairly stable over various subsamples – an important condition for
drawing inferences. For example, consider a stability test from Andrews (1993): the
maximum value of the likelihood-ratio test statistic for structural stability over all
possible breakpoints in the middle 70% of the sample. For (3), the maximum
likelihood-ratio test statistic is 12.54 (in 1972:4), while the 10% critical value is
16.20 – from Table 1 in Andrews (1993).
1.2. Output
The New Keynesian version of aggregate demand can be represented by an
intertemporal Euler equation of the form
yt ¼ Etytþ1   brðit   Etptþ1   r Þþgt ð4Þ
where yt is the output gap, Etyt+1 is the expectation of future output, it is the
short-term, nominal interest rate, and r* is the equilibrium real rate (McCallum
and Nelson, 1999a; Svensson, 1999a). Again, for realism, it is widely agreed that
some form of costly adjustment or habit formation must be added to the model
so as to match the inertia and lagged responses that are apparent in the data,
though the exact form of the resulting speciﬁcation is still under debate
(Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999; Fuhrer, 2000; McCallum and Nelson, 1999b;
Estrella and Fuhrer, 2001). For example, Svensson (1999a) replaces Etyt+1 with a
term such as lyEt)1yt+1 +( 1) ly)yt)1. Unfortunately, empirical estimates of ly
with quarterly data are hard to ﬁnd in the literature; thus, I follow much
previous analysis, notably Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Orphanides (1999),
and include only lags of output (i.e. ly ¼ 0). However, the Appendix does
provide an alternative set of results based on ly ¼ 0.3, which is suggested by the
only available estimate with quarterly data (Fuhrer, 2000). For the issues
addressed in this paper, little appears to hinge on the speciﬁcation of the
8 In other countries, Gruen et al. (1999) obtain estimates of lp that are less than 0.2 in Australia. The
Bank of England (1999, p. 91) reports an estimate of 0.175 with survey expectations in the UK, and with
the Bank of Canada model, Maclean (1998) uses a lp value of 0.2.
9 There are empirical studies, such as McCallum and Nelson (1999a, b) and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999), that essentially impose a value of unity on lp. Estrella and Fuhrer (2001) discuss the
empirical implausibility of such speciﬁcations; also, see section 2.3. In addition, Gali and Gertler (1999)
and Sbordone (1998) are sometimes (incorrectly) interpreted as obtaining empirical estimates of lp
close to unity; however, the evidence in these two papers pertains to the mark-up of price inﬂation
conditional on labour costs and has no relevance on its own for the value of lp; for further discussion,
see Roberts (2001).
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below.
10
For empirical implementation with quarterly data, I estimate an equation of the
form
yt ¼ by1yt 1 þ by2yt 2   br it 1   Et 1 p ptþ3 ðÞ þ gt ð5Þ
where, again, Et 1 p ptþ3 represents the expectation of average inﬂation over the
next year (obtained from survey data). Real output thus depends on its past values
and on an approximate ex ante real interest rate. (The data are de-meaned, so r*
equals zero.) The OLS estimated version of this equation using the sample period
1968:Q3–1996:Q4 is
yt ¼ 1:15 yt 1   0:27 yt 2   0:09 it 1   Et 1 p ptþ3 ðÞ þ gt
ð0:09Þð 0:09Þð 0:03Þð 6Þ
 R R
2 ¼ 0:89 rg ¼ 0:833 DW ¼ 2:14
As was the case above, this output equation appears to be stable over various
subsamples. The stability test from Andrews (1993) (the maximum value of the
likelihood-ratio teststatistic)is9.99 (in1974:1),while the 10% critical value is12.27.
1.3. Examination of Model Dynamics
It is instructive to compare the dynamics of the estimated New Keynesian structural
model (3) and (6) to an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR). While one may
be deeply sceptical of the use of VARs for certain structural investigations
(Rudebusch, 1998), they can provide a simple atheoretical summary of the data
and a useful benchmark of the general dynamics of a structural model. For this
comparison, I use a trivariate VAR with four lags of p, y and i. For example, the
VAR funds rate equation regresses the funds rate on four lags of each variable as
well as the contemporaneous values of the output gap and inﬂation.
11 This VAR
funds rate equation – with its interpretation as a Federal Reserve reaction function
– is also added as a third equation to the structural model (3) and (6). Because this
equation is shared by the VAR and the augmented structural model, any differ-
ences in dynamics between the two systems can be attributed to the output and
inﬂation equations.
Fig. 1 shows the responses of these two systems to various shocks. The impulse
responses of the structural system are shown as solid lines, while the VAR impulse
responses are shown as dashed lines along with their 95% conﬁdence intervals as
dotted lines.
12 In response to a positive funds rate shock, output and inﬂation
10 Indeed, as noted by McCallum (1997, p. 5), the Ball and Svensson result is ‘purely a result of the
particular Phillips curve’ that those authors employ and ‘is independent of aggregate demand
behavior’. Jensen (1999) also concludes that the amount of output persistence in the aggregate demand
speciﬁcation has little effect on assessing the desirability of nominal income targeting.
11 The VAR output equation regresses output on lags of p, y and i. The VAR inﬂation equation
regresses inﬂation on the same lags as well as the contemporaneous value of the output gap. Thus, this
VAR has a Cholesky factorisation with a causal order of output, inﬂation and the funds rate.
12 The impulse responses of the estimated forward-looking structural system (with the VAR interest
rate equation) are obtained from the reduced form which is calculated analytically as described below.
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13 A positive output shock persists over
time and boosts inﬂation in a like fashion in both models. The inﬂation shock also
shows substantial persistence. Overall, the structural model and VAR impulse
responses appear to be quite similar.
Thus, even though survey expectations were used to estimate the model, the
model dynamics under rational expectations appear to ﬁt the data fairly well.
Indeed, Fuhrer (1997) obtains an estimated inﬂation equation very similar to (3)
by essentially maximising the ﬁt between the autocorrelations of the model and
the data implicit in Fig. 1. In contrast, Fig. 2 compares the impulse responses of
the VAR to those from the structural model where the value of lp is set equal to
0.8. (Everything else about the two systems is held ﬁxed.) This model is empirically
implausible from the standpoint of survey expectations and, it appears, from the
standpoint of ﬁt to the data under rational expectations. The difﬁculty with a
model with such a high degree of forward-looking inﬂation behaviour is evident in
the top three panels of Fig. 2: The response of inﬂation is much faster in the
model than appears to be the case in practice. Notably, after a positive shock to the
funds rate, the inﬂation rate counterfactually jumps down immediately to a lower
level. Also, after an inﬂation shock, the inﬂation rate returns to the baseline level
Fig. 1. Impulse Responses for VAR and Structural Model (with lp ¼ 0.3). Note: The solid
lines are the impulse responses of the output and inﬂation model with lp ¼ 0.3 (with
the VAR interest rate equation appended). The impulse responses of the VAR are the
dashed lines along with dotted 95% conﬁdence intervals
13 There is a modest, insigniﬁcant ‘price puzzle’ exhibited by the VAR but not the structural model.
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sacriﬁce ratio is quite implausible (Estrella and Fuhrer, 2001).
2. Monetary Policy Rules
Given the empirical model described above, I examine the performance of three
speciﬁc simple policy rules that have been recommended by previous authors as
good guides for monetary policy. Two of these rules respond to the growth rate of
nominal output.
14 The ﬁrst such nominal income rule, denoted here as the N1
rule, is the one advocated by Orphanides (1999):
it ¼ r  þ  p pt þ g x xð x xt    x x 
t Þð 7Þ
This rule sets the nominal interest rate equal to the equilibrium real interest rate
(r  ) plus inﬂation ( p pt) plus some fraction g x x of the deviation of four-quarter
Fig. 2. Impulse Responses for VAR and Structural Model (with lp ¼ 0.8). Note: The solid
lines are the impulse responses of the output and inﬂation model with lp ¼ 0.8 (with
the VAR interest rate equation appended). The impulse responses of the VAR are the
dashed lines along with dotted 95% conﬁdence intervals
14 It is important to note that these are instrument rules that ‘respond to nominal output’. They are
not rules that actually ‘target’ nominal output, as discussed in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and
Svensson (1999b). Nominal output targeting rules would involve the minimisation of a loss function
over expected future deviations of nominal output from a desired level. Nominal output targeting also
could be expressed as a rule that changes the interest rate in response to many variables (particularly,
the determinants of nominal income) in order to produce a desired nominal income path. This strategy
is examined in Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) and is found to perform quite poorly, but Jensen
(1999) obtains more favourable results.
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t . Note that nominal
output growth can, of course, be re-written as the sum of inﬂation and real output
growth,  x xt    x x 
t ¼  p pt þ D4qt   p    D4q 
t , where D4qt ¼ qt ) qt)4 and D4q 
t is the
target (trend) growth rate of potential output.
15
The second nominal income rule, denoted as the N2 rule, is one suggested by
McCallum and Nelson (1999a):
it ¼ gxðxt   x 
t Þþqit 1 ð8Þ
This rule responds to the deviation of quarterly nominal output growth (at an
annual rate) from its target.
16 In terms of quarterly inﬂation and real output
growth (at an annual rate), xt   x 
t ¼ pt   p  þ 4Dqt   4Dq 
t . The N2 rule also re-
sponds to the lagged funds rate in an autoregressive fashion. (Such ‘interest rate
smoothing’ has been recommended by Levin et al. (1999) and Woodford (1999);
however, Rudebusch (2001b) shows that the historical evidence for such smooth-
ing is actually quite weak.)
As a benchmark to evaluate the performance of these nominal output rules, I
also consider a static Taylor-type rule (denoted as the T rule):
it ¼ r  þ  p pt þ gpð p pt   p Þþgyyt ð9Þ
which sets the nominal interest rate equal to the real equilibrium rate (r  ) plus
inﬂation and some fraction gp of four-quarter inﬂation deviations from target and
some fraction gy of the output gap. This rule performs well in a variety of models
(Taylor, 1999a) and as a simple two-parameter rule is the obvious alternative to the
N1 and N2 rules.
In analysing the performance of these rules, the actual numerical values chosen
for r   and p   do not affect the results, which are based on the second moments of
the goal variables in a linear model. Following standard normalisations (Rude-
busch and Svensson, 1999), I set r   and p   equal to zero. However, the use of the
normalisation r   ¼ 0 for the T and N1 rules has the important implication that the
policy maker knows the true equilibrium real rate embodied in the IS curve (5)
and incorporates this knowledge into the setting of rates. Indeed, a possible
advantage of the N2 rule is that it does not rely on knowledge of r  . However, as
shown in Rudebusch (2001a), uncertainty about r   in implementing rules such as
T and N1 is of little importance in this framework in terms of altering the optimal
rule coefﬁcients or the expected loss.
Similarly, in the next two sections, I also assume that the trend growth rate of
potential output is known to equal zero (i.e. Dq 
t ¼ D4q 
t ¼ 0), which implies that
target nominal output growth is also known to be zero (i.e. x 
t ¼  x x 
t ¼ 0). This
assumption is relaxed in section 5, when uncertainty about the growth rate of
potential output is introduced (which affects the gap between actual and desired
nominal output growth in the N1 and N2 rules).
These rules are simple because they can be written in terms of only a few
variables. In contrast, the fully optimal rule would involve all of the state variables
15 Nominal output is deﬁned as Nt ¼ PtQt,s o x xt ¼ 100ðlnNt   lnNt 4Þ¼ p pt þ D4qt. Similarly,
quarterly nominal output growth (at an annual rate) is deﬁned as xt ¼ 400(ln Nt ) ln Nt)1) ¼ pt +4 Dqt.
16 Judd and Motley (1992) also examine this rule with q ¼ 1.
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constraint on the form of the rule, the parameters of each of the three simple rules
are chosen so as to minimise the expected loss. Deriving the optimal forms of these
rules requires an objective function, and I use a fairly standard one in which the
central bank is assumed to minimise the variation in inﬂation around its target p  ,
in the output gap, and in changes in the interest rate (Rudebusch and Svensson,
1999; Clarida et al., 2000). Speciﬁcally, expected loss equals the weighted sum of
unconditional variances,
E Lt ðÞ ¼ Var  p pt   p  ðÞ þ kVar yt ðÞ þ mVar Dit ðÞ ð 10Þ
where Dit ¼ it ) it)1, and the parameters k ‡ 0 and m ‡ 0 are the relative weights on
output stabilisation and interest rate smoothing, respectively, with respect to in-
ﬂation stabilisation. Following Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Rudebusch
(2001a), I set k ¼ 1 and m ¼ 0.5 as a baseline case, but consider some alternatives in
the next section.
Finally, it should be noted that the results in this paper are obtained with a
rational expectations ‘commitment’ solution of the forward-looking structural
system of aggregate demand, aggregate supply and a policy rule.
17 That is, the
policy rule is assumed to be perfectly credible, so agents know the rule and assume
(correctly) that it will be followed. The use of simple policy rules may aid in such a
commitment. In addition, the solution takes no account of the fact that the
nominal interest rate is bounded from below by zero. The imposition of such a
constraint is discussed in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Reifschneider and
Williams (1999).
3. Model Uncertainty
Bennett McCallum (1988, 1998) has been an important proponent of the prin-
ciple of robustness, speciﬁcally, that a policy rule should yield reasonably good
outcomes in a wide variety of macroeconomic speciﬁcations. Robust policy rules
are preferred because of uncertainty regarding the exact representation of the
economy. Still, as noted above, there is a broad consensus that the aggregate
demand and supply framework described in section 1 is a useful one for analysing
policy rules. An important remaining unresolved issue is the degree to which
inﬂation is explicitly forward-looking in a model-consistent fashion. In this section,
I investigate the performance and robustness of the policy rules over a range of
such forward-looking behaviour. (In addition, the robustness of the rules to for-
ward-looking output terms in the output equation is considered in the Appendix.)
Table 1 examines the performance of the T, N1 and N2 rules assuming the loss
function (10) and the model (3) and (6). The three panels in the table present
results for the cases lp ¼ 0.0, lp ¼ 0.3 and lp ¼ 0.6 (the other parameters in the
model are ﬁxed). The estimation results above favour the intermediate value of
17 Speciﬁcally, the results are obtained using the ‘AIM’ algorithm (Anderson and Moore, 1985)
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss4/aimindex.html. This algorithm provides the
reduced-form solution to the linear rational expectations model, from which it is straightforward to
compute the relevant variances. The discretion solution to this model is considered in Dennis (1999).
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importance of investigating rule robustness recommend consideration of a wide
range of values for lp. The case with lp ¼ 0.0 (panel A) is important because the
inﬂation equation has completely adaptive expectations and is an empirical
counterpart to the theoretical model used by Ball (1999) and Svensson (1997). As
noted above, the very upper end of the plausible empirical range of lp is 0.6, and
that is the case considered in panel C.
Thus, Table 1 goes to the heart of the debate between Ball (1999), Svensson
(1999a) and McCallum (1997). In panel A, with lp ¼ 0.0, the caution expressed by
Ball and Svensson about the performance of nominal income rules is apparent. In
the ﬁrst line, the Taylor-type T rule (with optimal coefﬁcients given in paren-
theses) has an expected loss of 9.76 with unconditional standard deviations of
inﬂation, output, and interest rates of Std  p pt ðÞ ¼ 1:98, Std(yt) ¼ 2.07, and
Std(Dit) ¼ 1.75. In contrast, the N1 and N2 rules do substantially worse with losses
of 14.34 and 16.67, respectively. Under a strict interpretation, however, the Ball
and Svensson result of the dynamic instability of nominal income rules does not
generalise to this model with adaptive expectations but longer, empirically
plausible lags. Still, the spirit of their result does endure, as the relative
performance of the nominal income rule appears to deserve Ball’s (1999) term
‘disastrous’.
18
Panels B and C explore whether adding rational expectations to the inﬂation
dynamics improves the relative performance of nominal output rules as suggested
by McCallum. Again, as a general statement, this does not appear to be true. The
performance of the nominal output rules relative to the Taylor rule actually
Table 1
Results for Three Optimised Simple Rules
Volatility results
Rule Std( p pt) Std(yt) Std(Dit) Expected loss
ðAÞ Model with lp ¼ 0:0
T( gp ¼ 2.06, gy ¼ 1.55) 1.98 2.07 1.75 9.76
N1 (gx ¼ 1.10) 2.61 2.50 1.61 14.34
N2 (gx ¼ 0.57, q ¼ 0.72) 2.90 2.37 2.28 16.67
ðBÞ Model with lp ¼ 0:3
T( gp ¼ 1.86, gy ¼ 1.74) 1.62 1.78 1.87 7.54
N1 (gx ¼ 1.52) 2.51 2.38 2.20 14.35
N2 (gx ¼ 0.77, q ¼ 0.68) 2.87 2.24 3.08 18.04
ðCÞ Model with lp ¼ 0:6
T( gp ¼ 0.88, gy ¼ 1.55) 1.09 1.55 1.59 4.86
N1 (gx ¼ 1.25) 1.47 1.70 1.78 6.65
N2 (gx ¼ 0.43, q ¼ 0.95) 1.19 1.63 1.65 5.44
18 This is consistent with the earlier results of Taylor (1985), Judd and Motley (1992) and de Brouwer
and O’Regan (1997). As Taylor (1985, p. 81) notes, ‘Nominal GNP rules that focus solely on the growth
rate could worsen business-cycle ﬂuctuations by always causing the economy to overshoot its equilibrium
after shocks’. Such overshooting is apparent in the impulse responses to shocks described below.
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three rules produce much more similar volatilities and losses. This result is ap-
parent in Fig. 3, which graphs the expected loss of the optimal forms of the three
rules for the entire zero-to-one range of lp. McCallum appears to be correct in
asserting that, with high levels of explicitly forward-looking price-setting behaviour,
nominal output rules are a reasonable alternative to the Taylor rule. Still, a crucial
issue in resolving the debate about good policy rules is whether Ball or McCallum
consider an empirically more relevant case. As should be clear from the empirical
evidence summarised above, it is very unlikely that lp is greater than 0.6; therefore,
from Fig. 1, Ball’s conclusions about the performance of nominal output rules for
monetary policy seem appropriately pessimistic.
In this regard, it is also instructive to examine the impulse responses of the
model. Fig. 4 displays the responses of output, inﬂation and the funds rate to an
output shock for the three policy rules under the assumption that lp ¼ 0.3. Two
features are of particular note. First, the ﬂuctuations of output and inﬂation are
not sychronised, with movements in inﬂation trailing those in output. Again, this
reﬂects the persistence of inﬂation evident in the VAR summary of the data in
Fig. 1. Second, with the nominal income rules, there is a sustained oscillation in
the economy, which reﬂects the higher variability evident for this case in Table 1.
Fig. 5 provides an extreme alternative: the case with lp ¼ 0.8. In this case, inﬂa-
tion has very little persistence and, counterfactually, appears synchronised with
output. All three of the rules are easily able to damp economic ﬂuctuations in this
case.
Fig. 3. Expected Loss From Three Optimised Simple Rules
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function. The above results assumed that the relative weights on output and in-
terest rate volatility are k ¼ 1 and m ¼ 0.5. As shown in Fig. 6, setting k to 2 or 0.5 or
raising m to 2 does not change the results. Fig. 7 provides a more conventional view
of alternative loss functions (Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999) by showing the
tradeoff between output (yt) and inﬂation ( p pt) volatility as k is varied from 0.2 to 9.
For the model with lp ¼ 0, the usual tradeoff exists for all three rules: A higher
output variability and lower inﬂation variability is chosen as k decreases, though
the T rule generates the most favourable outcome. For the model with lp ¼ 0.6,
the trade-offs look quite different. The T rule trade-off is essentially vertical
because with a forward-looking (mean-reverting) inﬂation process the rule can
stabilise inﬂation independently of output; thus, the k trade-off is between yt and
Dit stabilisation (which would be apparent in a three-dimensional ﬁgure). In
contrast, the N1 and N2 rules cannot respond separately to output and inﬂation
ﬂuctuations, which are synchronised; therefore the only remaining trade-off is
between yt (or  p pt) variation and Dit variation.
To return to the issue of model uncertainty, Table 1 and Fig. 3 provide some
insight into the debate about how well nominal income rules perform in various
models. However, these results do not capture the model uncertainty faced by a
policy maker. A policy maker must rely on a particular parameterisation of a rule
(with given numerical coefﬁcients) and then consider the performance of that
given rule across various models. This issue of the performance of a ﬁxed rule
across models is the essence of the model robustness criterion championed by
McCallum (1998).
A general approach to optimal robust policy is to pick the rule that does best
over the set of all possible models, with each model weighted by its appropriate
probability (Rudebusch, 2001a). As stressed by Stock (1999), the practical difﬁ-
culty in applying this procedure stems from determining the probability distri-
bution of possible models. For example, given the disparate empirical evidence
reviewed in section 1, it is difﬁcult to summarise the likely value of lp other than
saying it almost certainly lies in the 0.0–0.6 range. Still, even with such a diffuse
distribution of likely values, it is possible to come to some conclusions by consid-
ering a few special cases. For example, consider the particular parameterisations of
the N1, N2 and the T rules that are optimal when lp equals 0.0, 0.3 and 0.6 (the
parameters are given in Table 1). The three panels of Fig. 8 display the loss from
applying these nine speciﬁc rules in a range of models with varying values of lp.
The dot on each line in the ﬁgure is placed at the value of lp for which the rule is
optimal. For example, the results in the middle panel are relevant for the policy
maker who thinks 0.3 is the most likely value for lp and so optimises the policy rule
for that situation. However, the policy maker must consider the performance of
the rule in the event that the actual value of lp is not equal to 0.3. As is apparent in
the middle panel, this particular T rule (which is optimised for lp ¼ 0.3) domin-
ates the particular N1 and N2 rules (which are also optimised for lp ¼ 0.3) at all
possible values of lp. Thus, regardless of the distribution of lp that is envisioned by
the policy maker (e.g. normal centred at 0.3, uniform from 0.0 to 0.6, etc.), this T
rule will be preferred over the nominal output rules.
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For example, in the top panel of Fig. 8, the policy maker chooses the optimal
simple rules assuming lp ¼ 0.0. If in fact the value of lp is something else, the
chosen T rule still dominates the nominal output rules in performance. The
bottom panel of Fig. 8 provides an important example of the non-robustness of a
policy rule. In this panel, the rules are optimised assuming that lp ¼ 0.6. As noted
in the earlier results, at lp ¼ 0.6, the nominal income rules – and in particular the
N2 rule – perform about as well as the T rule (so the three dots in the lower panel
are clustered together). However, the particular parameterisation of the N2 rule
that is optimal at lp ¼ 0.6 performs extremely poorly at other values of lp.I n
particular, at values of lp less than 0.5, this N2 rule is dynamically unstable. Thus,
even a policy maker who thought that lp was quite high would likely not choose
the N2 rule because of the poor economic outcome in the case of a lower value of
lp. (Onatski (2000) provides a fascinating extension of this work by introducing a
nonparametric set of perturbations to this model and also ﬁnds that the nominal
income rules have worse robustness characteristics.)
To summarise the results: nominal income rules do very poorly in New
Keynesian models with empirically plausible amounts of forward-looking beha-
viour and persistence. Furthermore, from the standpoint of robustness, the N2
rule suggested by McCallum and Nelson (1999a) appears to be particularly
deﬁcient.
Fig. 7. Policy Rule Volatility Frontiers
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In the previous section, the T rule was shown to perform quite well across a range
of plausible model speciﬁcations. As many have noted, however, setting monetary
policy on the basis of the level of the output gap, as in the Taylor rule, requires
relying on a quantity that is difﬁcult to measure accurately in real time (McCallum,
1998; Clarida et al. 2000; Smets, 1999; Rudebusch, 2001a). For example, Fig. 9
plots real-time estimates and ﬁnal revised estimates of manufacturing capacity
utilisation, a measure closely related to the output gap.
19 The real-time errors are
clearly large in size and quite persistent; indeed, one-sided errors of a percentage
point or more can extend for several quarters. As described in Rudebusch (2001a)
and Orphanides et al. (1999), the real-time output gap measurement errors ex-
hibit similar features. Accordingly, Orphanides (1999) suggests that there may be
enough uncertainty in the real-time measurement of the output gap so that a
nominal income rule (and speciﬁcally the N1 rule above) may outperform the
Taylor rule. This section investigates this suggestion by only considering real-time
data uncertainty about the output gap. This setting puts nominal income rules in
the best possible situation and provides an upper bound on their relative
performance. The next section will incorporate real-time data uncertainty about
inﬂation and other variables.
Fig. 9. Real-time and Final Estimates of Capacity Utilisation
19 In this ﬁgure, the quarterly real-time series is deﬁned as the average of the initial release of the
second month and the ﬁrst revision of the ﬁrst month of each quarter. These data were available in the
third month of the same quarter. These data were kindly provided by Evan Koenig (1996).
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on a contemporaneous estimate of the output gap, namely, yt |t. That is, the T rule
(9) is modiﬁed to become
20
it ¼  p pt þ gp p pt þ gyytjt ð11Þ
There are, of course, no published data on contemporaneous real GDP or po-
tential output; however, in real time, the policy maker does have a large amount of
information about the current-quarter state of the economy by the way of monthly,
or even weekly, statistics on production, employment, spending and prices. Still,
yt |t is only a very noisy contemporaneous output gap estimate, which I assume is
related to the true series by
ytjt ¼ yt þ n
y
t ð12Þ
The stochastic error n
y
t is the real-time measurement error plaguing the policy
maker.
21 It arises from errors in assessing both contemporaneous actual and
potential output and has a standard error of rny.
The variability of n
y
t – i.e., the size of rny – is crucial for determining how
important output gap uncertainty will be in evaluating policy rules. There are two
basic modelling strategies in the literature measuring the amount of real-time
uncertainty in the output gap. Each provides some important insights. One
method, employed in Kuttner (1994), Smets (1999), Drew and Hunt (1999) and
Tetlow (2000), uses a Kalman ﬁlter to roll through a sample of ﬁnal, revised data to
obtain a sequence of estimates of the model-consistent output gap. With this
technique, for example, Smets (1999) estimates a rny of about 1.1 in the USA for a
model with lp ¼ 0.0. This method assumes that all of the uncertainty in the output
gap comes from uncertainty about potential output and ignores both revisions to
the GDP data and the real-time uncertainty about the speciﬁcation of the model.
22
A second method takes into account these last two uncertainties but is purely
empirically based. That is, estimates of rny, the standard deviations of the meas-
urement error, are obtained by comparing the real-time historical estimates to the
ﬁnal estimates as they stand today – as in Fig. 9. Notably, the analyses in Rudebusch
(2001a) and Orphanides et al. (1999) suggest estimates of rny in the 1.0–2.0%
range (depending on the exact sample and measure of resource utilisation).
23
Furthermore, the persistence in the output gap noise appears well-modelled by an
AR(1) process: n
y
t ¼ qnyn
y
t 1 þ n
y
t, with estimates of qny in the range of 0.75–0.95.
These two approaches provide different but quite complementary perspectives
about output gap uncertainty. I use the second method to analyse the nominal
income rules following the discussion in Orphanides (1999).
20 Again, assuming r* ¼ p* ¼ 0.
21 See Rudebusch (2001a) for a discussion of the ‘news vs noise’ cross-correlations between the real-
time estimates and the revisions and between the ﬁnal estimates and the revisions.
22 McCallum and Nelson (1999a) stress the model uncertainty involved in real-time output gap
estimates. In their calibrated model, the true level of potential output is very different from the typical
smooth representation used in most macroeconomic analysis.
23 This corresponds to a 0.5–1.0 percentage point standard deviation for the unemployment gap,
which seems reasonable given the amount of uncertainty in the estimates of the natural rate of
unemployment (Staiger et al., 1997).
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under various assumptions about the degree of data uncertainty. The standard
deviation of the noise, rny, is given the values 0, 1, 2 or 3; as the research cited
above indicates, the middle two of these cases are the most plausible. The coefﬁ-
cient qny is set equal to 0.85. Panels A, B and C consider the three models with
lp ¼ 0.0, 0.3 or 0.6. With no output gap uncertainty (rny ¼ 0), the results match
the T rule results in Table 1. For each model, increasing the amount of data
uncertainty reduces the optimal T rule coefﬁcient on the output gap and increases
volatility and expected loss in an intuitive fashion.
24 Most importantly, note that in
Panel B (when lp ¼ 0.3), even the highest loss recorded by the T rule (12.43 with
rny ¼ 3) is signiﬁcantly lower than the 14.35 loss recorded for the N1 rule or the
18.04 loss recorded for the N2 rule with no data uncertainty and lp ¼ 0.3 (in
Table 1). That is, plausible or even fairly extreme amounts of output gap uncer-
tainty do not appear to be enough to offset the innate poor performance of the
nominal income rules.
Similar results obtain in panel A with lp ¼ 0.0, the very worst performance of the
T rule (a 12.86 loss) still bests that of the N1 and N2 rules (losses of 14.34 and
16.67, respectively). In contrast, in panel C, with lp ¼ 0.6, the range of T rule
results over varying amounts of output gap uncertainty brackets the nominal
income rule results, with the N2 rule (with a 5.44 loss) falling at the lower end of
Table 2
Optimal Taylor Rule Results with Output Gap Uncertainty
ytjt Noise Rule parameters Volatility results
rny gp gy Std( p pt) Std(yt) Std(Dit) Expected loss
(A) Model with lp ¼ 0:0
0.0 2.06 1.55 1.98 2.07 1.75 9.76
1.0 1.92 1.26 2.04 2.21 1.70 10.48
2.0 1.69 0.82 2.15 2.44 1.55 11.77
3.0 1.49 0.51 2.26 2.62 1.37 12.86
(B) Model with lp ¼ 0:3
0.0 1.86 1.74 1.62 1.78 1.87 7.54
1.0 1.86 1.43 1.72 1.97 1.88 8.59
2.0 1.80 0.98 1.91 2.28 1.85 10.56
3.0 1.70 0.66 2.10 2.54 1.77 12.43
(C) Model with lp ¼ 0:6
0.0 0.88 1.55 1.09 1.55 1.59 4.86
1.0 1.23 1.12 1.19 1.73 1.59 5.65
2.0 1.46 0.65 1.29 1.94 1.56 6.62
3.0 1.55 0.38 1.35 2.06 1.52 7.22
24 Note that for a given model in Table 2 (i.e. for a particular panel), more output gap uncertainty
results in a smaller optimal rule output coefﬁcient. As noted in Rudebusch (2001a) and Orphanides
et al. (1999), certainty equivalence does not apply because these are simple rules and the real-time gap
estimates are not optimal current-quarter estimates in the context of the structural model.
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range.
25
Still, Table 2 does not capture the full weight of uncertainty faced by a policy-
maker. In real time, the policy maker must choose a particular policy rule with
given parameters in the face of an unknown amount of output gap measurement
error. Such uncertainty about the amount of output gap measurement error is the
analogue to the model uncertainty and robustness discussed above. Fig. 10 pro-
vides evidence on the robustness of three such speciﬁc rule parameterisations;
namely, the optimal T, N1 and N2 rules assuming lp ¼ 0.3 and, for the T rule,
rny ¼ 2. The expected loss values for the N1 and N2 rules in Fig. 10 thus match
those in panel B of Fig. 8. (Again, the solid dot shows the value of lp for which the
rule is optimised.) The solid line for the T rule is the loss with rny ¼ 2, which is the
value for which the policy rule has been optimised. The dotted and dashed lines
are for that same T rule but with rny ¼ 3 and rny ¼ 1, respectively, which differ
from what the policy maker assumes.
From the perspective of robustness, the T rule does very well and, even in the
absence of speciﬁc probability distributions for lp and rny, it is possible to make
some fairly deﬁnitive comparisons. Clearly, for example, the T rule dominates
the N2 rule completely across all model and data uncertainty perturbations.
Similarly, the N1 rule is surpassed by the T rule in all but a very narrow set of
Fig. 10. Expected Loss with Real-Time Output Gap and Model Uncertainty
25 With lp ¼ 0.0, this model is similar (except for the use of an ex ante real rate) to the one used by
Orphanides (1999). Orphanides, however, only considers non-optimised versions of the T and N1 rules.
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measures with rny ¼ 3).
Overall, the T rule does exceptionally well against the nominal output rules
especially considering that only data uncertainty about the output gap has been
included.
5. Hybrid Rules
The above results demonstrate that the T rule pretty clearly dominates two altern-
ative nominal output rules that have been proposed in the literature, even after
consideration of likely model and output gap uncertainty. However, a policy maker
need not be limited to just the discrete choice among these three simple rules.
Especially with output gap uncertainty, it may be better to consider rules that
augment the T rule response to inﬂation and the output gap with an additional
response to nominal output growth. Speciﬁcally, consider hybrid rules of the form
it ¼  p ptjt þ gp p ptjt þ gyytjt þ g x x x xtjt ð13Þ
Such a rule incorporates information on the real output gap and four-quarter
nominal income growth; thus, it nests both the T and N1 rules.
Note that the hybrid rule is written to allow for real-time measurement error in all
of the variables and not just the output gap. This allows for a balanced assessment of
the various arguments of the rule. To add measurement error, it is useful to rewrite
the hybrid rule in another form. Speciﬁcally, splitting nominal output growth into
the sum of inﬂation and real output growth, the hybrid rule can be rewritten as
it ¼  p ptjt þð gp þ g x xÞ p ptjt þ gyytjt þ g x xD4ytjt ð14Þ
This makes clear that the value in adding a nominal income growth response to
the T rule is in the inclusion of a real output growth response. Federal Reserve
Governor, Gramlich (1999), has discussed just such a real output growth or ‘speed
limit’ modiﬁcation of the Taylor rule. This modiﬁcation is isomorphic to the
addition of a nominal output response.
For rule (14), the real-time measurement errors are modelled as
ytjt ¼ yt þ n
y
t,  p ptjt ¼  p pt þ np
t , and D4ytjt ¼ D4yt þ n
Dy
t ð15Þ
The output gap revisions, n
y
t, are modelled as above. The inﬂation revisions, np
t ,
can be obtained from the real-time and ﬁnal inﬂation data. In the sample exam-
ined by Rudebusch (2001a), the associated standard error, rn p p, was equal to 0:34 –
much smaller than for the output gap – and the persistence of the revisions was
well modelled by the third-order moving average process:
np
t ¼ n
p
t þ 0:63n
p
t 1 þ 0:26n
p
t 2 þ 0:18n
p
t 3 ð16Þ
Finally, the revisions to the four-quarter change in the output gap, n
Dy
t , appear well
modelled as an AR(1) process
n
Dy
t ¼ qnDyn
Dy
t 1 þ n
Dy
t
However, unlike for the level of the output gap, the n
Dy
t revisions are much smaller
in size and less persistent (Orphanides et al., 1999). I model these revisions as an
AR(1) with rnDy equal to 0.5 or 1.0 and with qnDy ¼ 0.5.
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ment error processes are examined in Table 3.
26 The three columns on the left
describe the type and size of real-time data uncertainty. For all the results, the size
of the output gap level uncertainty is held at rny ¼ 2, a plausible base case. The
data noise in inﬂation is varied with rn p p equal to 0, 0.3, or 0.6, and the data noise in
the four-quarter change in the output gap is varied with rnDy equal to 0, 0.5, or 1.0.
Panel A examines the performance of the pure T rule in this setting. The addi-
tional information in this panel beyond Table 2 is the inclusion of inﬂation data
noise – a nonzero rn p p. The addition of the empirically plausible amounts of such
noise reduces the optimal T rule inﬂation coefﬁcient (gp) and adds about a tenth
or two to the standard deviations of inﬂation and the change in the interest rate.
Panel B considers a hybrid rule that incorporates a response to the quarterly
change in nominal output as suggested by the N2 rule (equivalently this can be
viewed as the addition of the quarterly change in real output). Even with no
measurement error, the quarterly change in nominal output has an optimal co-
efﬁcient of essentially zero and makes almost no contribution to macroeconomic
stabilisation.
Finally, Panel C examines the hybrid rule with the four-quarter change in
nominal output, i.e. rule (13) or (14). The addition of four-quarter output growth
appears to make a perceptible, but very modest, contribution to macroeconomic
stabilisation. The optimal coefﬁcient on (nominal or real) output growth (g x x)
ranges from 0.3 to 0.5, which suggests that the policy maker should raise the policy
interest rate by 30–50 basis points above that suggested by a T rule when output
Table 3
Optimal Hybrid Rule Results with Real-Time Data Uncertainty
Data noise Rule prameters Volatility results
rny rn p p rnDy gp gy gx or gx Std( p pt) Std(yt) Std(Dit) Expected loss
(A) Rule: it ¼  p ptjt þ gp p ptjt þ gyytjt
2.0 0.0 0.0 1.80 0.98 – 1.91 2.28 1.85 10.56
2.0 0.3 0.0 1.67 0.96 – 1.98 2.27 1.96 11.01
2.0 0.6 0.0 1.42 0.92 – 2.14 2.27 2.21 12.17
(B) Rule: it ¼  p ptjt þ gp p ptjt þ gyytjt þ gxxtjt
2.0 0.0 0.0 1.76 0.95 0.04 1.91 2.26 1.88 10.54
(C) Rule: it ¼  p ptjt þ gp p ptjt þ gyytjt þ gxxtjt
2.0 0.0 0.0 1.43 0.82 0.52 1.87 2.17 1.95 10.10
2.0 0.3 0.0 1.28 0.81 0.49 1.95 2.16 2.06 10.59
2.0 0.3 0.5 1.32 0.82 0.44 1.95 2.17 2.05 10.62
2.0 0.3 1.0 1.40 0.85 0.34 1.95 2.20 2.04 10.71
2.0 0.6 0.0 1.03 0.79 0.44 2.12 2.16 2.30 11.82
2.0 0.6 0.5 1.07 0.80 0.40 2.12 2.17 2.30 11.85
2.0 0.6 1.0 1.15 0.82 0.31 2.12 2.19 2.28 11.92
26 I assume that the data revisions are independently distributed. It would be interesting to examine
the various cross-correlations of these revisions. For example, nominal output may be measured with
little error if the output gap change and inﬂation revisions are negatively correlated. However, the
requisite sample of available Federal Reserve data has been held in conﬁdence.
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response reduces the standard deviation of the output gap by about a tenth of a
percentage point from the comparable T rule outcome but increases interest rate
volatility (which has a smaller weight in the baseline loss function) by about the
same amount. Overall, very little macroeconomic stabilisation is lost by using the T
rule instead of the hybrid rule.
6. Conclusion
McCallum (1998), McCallum and Nelson (1999a), Orphanides (1999) and earlier
authors argue that real-time output gap uncertainty and model uncertainty (es-
pecially about the persistence of inﬂation) suggest that monetary policy rules that
respond to nominal output growth could perform quite well. The above analysis
generally supports their logic in principle but decisively rejects their arguments as
persuasive for the postwar US economy. The nominal output rules espoused by
these authors do quite poorly over the plausible empirical range of model and data
uncertainty. Furthermore, a more general rule that nests the Taylor rule and the
nominal income rule suggests that output growth has little to add to optimal policy
even with plausible data measurement errors.
The above analysis examines an important set of issues raised in the literature
and comes to generally pessimistic conclusions regarding the performance of
nominal output rules. Still, this analysis is not a deﬁnitive inquiry into the merits of
nominal output rules. Obviously, the results are conditional on the simple model
used, and extensions of the analysis to consider richer models with open-economy
effects and more detailed or different price adjustment and aggregate demand
speciﬁcations are recommended; although as noted above, as long as the monetary
transmission lag from interest rates to output is signiﬁcantly shorter than
from interest rates to inﬂation, the nominal income rules (which lump the two
together) will likely have difﬁculty stabilising the economy. Furthermore, as
stressed by McCallum (1998) and Svensson (1999b), a variety of other issues, such
as the ease of policy communication and the likelihood of transparency, should
also be considered in a complete assessment of policy rules.
In the context of the above loss function, however, some have suggested that the
real-time information set of policy makers may be somewhat different from the
one modelled above. Notably, there may be episodes of identiﬁable structural
change during which policy makers believe that measures of the output gap are
particularly uncertain. In the USA, an examination of the output gap revisions
does not readily suggest the presence of such information. However, in Europe,
just after the start of monetary union, measures of euro-area potential output may
have been particularly uncertain, so the optimal weight on the output gap relative
to real or nominal output growth in a hybrid rule may be reduced. In a similar
fashion, output growth may be a useful indicator for monetary policy at certain
times during the business cycle: For example, while fast growth coming out of
recession may have no implications for the stance of monetary policy, fast growth
at cyclical booms may require policy responses. Thus, even if policy makers have
only broad qualitative information about the level of the output gap, output
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time-varying optimal rule parameters and the nature of the real-time information
set of policy makers is required to investigate such rationales.
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Appendix: An Alternative Forward-looking Output Equation
This appendix provides an alternative set of results using an output equation that is
modiﬁed to incorporate explicitly forward-looking output expectations. As noted in
section 1, such a speciﬁcation, which is based on the standard Euler equation for
household behaviour in which current consumption depends on future consumption
and the real rate, qualiﬁes better as New Keynesian in spirit. However, the standard
Euler equation with forward-looking behaviour displays a severe lack of empirical ﬁt as
shown in Estrella and Fuhrer (2001). Indeed, one of the few (and perhaps the only)
available empirical estimates of the weight on explicit future output expectations in the
output equation is provided in Fuhrer (2000). He estimates a model of consumption
that augments the usual consumption Euler equation with both ‘habit formation’ and
‘rule-of-thumb’ behaviour. McCallum and Nelson (1999b) provide a linearised version
of the ﬁrst-order conditions of this model with only habit formation (their equation
34), which can be rewritten with Fuhrer’s parameter estimates as
ct ¼ 0:323ct 1 þ 0:677Etctþ1   0:017rt þ gt ðA:1Þ
where ct is (following Fuhrer) the log of per capita detrended nondurable goods and
services consumption and rt is an ex ante real rate.
27 These empirical estimates suggest
that consumers place about a two-thirds weight on future consumption in determining
current consumption. However, it is important to note that, to ﬁt an empirical model
of total real output, Fuhrer (2000) uses (A.1) to explain only about half of real
output. There are two restrictions on its coverage. First, to ﬁt the model, Fuhrer
estimates that this Euler equation applies to only about 74% of nondurables and
services consumption with the remaining fraction of consumption determined by the
rule of thumb, ct ¼ yt. Second, he uses a completely autoregressive model to ﬁt the
non-consumption portion of real output, which averages about 41% of the total over
the sample. Thus, taking into account these various fractions, Fuhrer’s model of total
real output – as estimated – has about a one-third weight on explicit expectations of
future output. To approximate this weight on the future, I generalise the model of
section 1 as
yt ¼ lyEt 1ytþ1 þð 1   lyÞðby1yt 1 þ by2yt 2Þ br ıt 1   Et 1ptþ3 ðÞ þ gt ðA:2Þ
and set ly ¼ 0.3 while the other parameters retain their previous values.
28
27 The coefﬁcient shown for Etct+1 is actually the sum of the coefﬁcients on Etct+1 and Etct+2 (namely
0.997 plus )0.320), which I collapse together to eliminate extraneous dynamics that have no effect on
the results. Also, note that McCallum and Nelson (1999b) appear to use Fuhrer’s 0.017 value for interest
rate sensitivity directly instead of dividing by four with their non-annualised interest rates.
28 Even worse results for the nominal income growth rules were obtained with other forward-looking
output equations, including using (A.1) directly for all of real output with yt in place of ct.
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the model with an output equation with ly ¼ 0.3. As shown in Table A1, the T rule
still dominates the N1 and N2 rules for lp ¼ 0.0, 0.3, or 0.6 and ly ¼ 0.3.
Furthermore, as shown in Table A2, with little exception, the T rule continues to
dominate even after signiﬁcant output gap noise is incorporated into the analysis.
Table A2
Optimal Taylor Rule Results with Output Gap Uncertainty
ytjt Noise Rule Parameters Volatility Results
rny gp gy Std( p pt) Std(yt) Std(Dit) Expected Loss
(A) Model with lp ¼ 0:0 and ly ¼ 0:3
0.0 1.45 1.01 1.78 1.90 1.23 7.51
1.0 1.29 0.77 1.80 2.01 1.14 7.95
2.0 1.03 0.42 1.86 2.18 0.95 8.64
3.0 0.86 0.21 1.91 2.27 0.81 9.10
(B) Model with lp ¼ 0:3 and ly ¼ 0:3
0.0 1.23 1.06 1.36 1.58 1.22 5.12
1.0 1.18 0.81 1.40 1.74 1.17 5.68
2.0 1.04 0.47 1.47 2.00 1.05 6.23
3.0 0.89 0.26 1.53 2.14 0.93 7.35
(C) Model with lp ¼ 0:6 and ly ¼ 0:3
0.0 0.36 0.94 0.90 1.31 0.98 3.01
1.0 0.59 0.63 0.93 1.48 0.92 3.47
2.0 0.61 0.31 0.96 1.65 0.82 3.96
3.0 0.57 0.16 0.97 1.73 0.75 4.21
Table A1
Results for Three Optimised Simple Rules
Volatility Results
Rule Std( p pt) Std(yt) Std(Dit) Expected Loss
(A) Model with lp ¼ 0:0 and ly ¼ 0:3
T( gp ¼ 1.45, gy ¼ 1.01) 1.78 1.90 1.23 7.51
N1 (gx ¼ 0.66) 2.16 2.12 1.03 9.68
N2 (gx ¼ 0.47, q ¼ 0.71) 2.60 2.06 1.94 13.00
(B) Model with lp ¼ 0:3 and ly ¼ 0:3
T( gp ¼ 1.23, gy ¼ 1.06) 1.36 1.58 1.22 5.12
N1 (gx ¼ 0.79) 1.86 2.02 1.19 8.23
N2 (gx ¼ 0.60, q ¼ 0.67) 2.42 1.98 2.53 13.01
(C) Model with lp ¼ 0:6 and ly ¼ 0:3
T( gp ¼ 0.36, gy ¼ 0.94) 0.90 1.31 0.98 3.01
N1 (gx ¼ 0.65) 1.01 1.50 1.01 3.77
N2 (gx ¼ 0.27, q ¼ 0.96) 0.98 1.40 1.04 3.47
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